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Racist Utterances as Quasi-fictional:






theydonothave illocutionary acts asnormalutterances. It is clear, however, that





argument, this paperwill examineSearleʼs theory of fiction.FollowingHabermasʼs
frameworkofcommunicationtheory,fictionseemsatfirstglancetobeanutterancethat
shouldbelongtodramaturgicalaction.However,becausetheelementofrole-playing is








Searleʼs theory of fiction,which focuses on thepretention of illocutionary acts, by
illustrating several actual racist utterances as strategic action. Iwill then rethink
Habermasʼstheoryofdramaturgicalaction,arguethatthiscategoryisincompatiblewith











words, hedevelops an explanation that refers to speech act theorybypositioning































orpronouncinga judgment. In this case, the speakerneeds to secureuptaking the
illocutionaryact they intend toperform (cf. Strawson1964, pp. 122-123).From this,
Strawsondrawsthefollowingconclusions:
[T]he illocutionaryforceofanutterance isessentiallysomethingthat is intendedto







Aspeaker, ifhewants tobe successful,maynot lethisperlocutionaryaimsbe
known,whereas illocutionaryaimscanbeachievedonly throughbeingexpressed.















The specific instancehe envisions is the act of deceiving the opponent.However,
accordingtothiscriterion,onlytheactofusinganillocutionaryacttodeceiveoroutwit
the opponent canbe aperlocutionaryact. In otherwords, perlocution requires the
establishment of illocution in the context of teleological action. InHabermasʼsview,
communicativeaction is the “originalmodeof languageuse” and strategic action is
“parasitic”(Habermas1984,p.288)1）.
　However,thisnewcriterionnarrowsthedomainofperlocutionmorethanAustinhad
inmind.Forexample,Austin argues that theperlocutionaryactmaybeeither the
achievementof aperlocutionaryobjectorproductionof anaccidental orunintended
perlocutionarysequel(cf.Austin1962,p.118).SinceHabermasassumesonlyacontextof

























an intimidatingorder fromasupervisor)orviolence (e.g., abankrobberywithagun




　Later,Habermas (especiallyafter theexchangesbetweenSkjei [1985]andHabermas
[1985b])dividedthecategoryofstrategicactsinto“latent-strategicaction”and“manifest




























achievesomeperlocutionarygoalandactas if it isnot.Still,“the latent-strategicuseof
languagelivesparasiticallyoffnormallinguisticusage”(Habermas1994,p.53).
　Of course, this amendmentwould causeHabermasʼs criterion for distinguishing
illocutionaryactsfromperlocutionaryacts—thatis,whethertheintentionmustbeknown
ornot—tobereassessedforitsstatus.Thisisbecauseinamanifeststrategicaction,the
perlocutionary intention isknowntothe listener.Thus,Habermasʼsoriginalcriterionno
longer servesasacriterion fordistinguishingperlocutionary from illocutionaryacts.
Nevertheless, itmaybeuseful formakingexplicit thedistinctionbetween latentand
manifeststrategicactions,and isstillaconditiontobemet for illocutionaryacts.This
distinctionalsoprovidesusefulinsightsintotheplaceofracistdiscourseincommunication,
amongotherthings.
2. Racist Utterances and Pretending Communicative Action
Note: This section contains several direct quotations of racist expressions against American 
people of African descent. Although the author quotes them with the purpose of criticizing 
them, they still have the potential to make the reader feel uncomfortable and revive wounds 
from the past. Thus, skip this section if it is better for you.
　Ingeneral, racistutterancesshouldbeclassifiedasastrategicactionrather thana





also insults. In the caseof insults,whichHabermasmentionsverybriefly, it is also
possible toachieveaperlocutionarygoal in theactofutterance thatgoesbeyondthe
understandingofthecontentofthespeechalreadyinthespeechact(cf.Habermas1994,
p.56).This isalso true forracistutterances,especially forexplicithatespeech.Letus
beginourdiscussionwiththisgroup.




made the following remark about immigrants fromHaiti,El Salvador, andAfrican
countriesduringameetingintheOvalOfficeonJanuary11,2018.




beaquestionasacommunicativeactionoran indirectdirective toconsider specific
measures, itwould still be speech that discriminates against immigrants from the
pre-nominatedcountriesbyvirtueoftheirplaceoforigin.Inotherwords,independentof
whether thisutterance isanykindof illocutionaryactorevenan illocutionaryact, a
particularperlocutionaryeffectcanbeproducedsolelybytheutteranceactinthecontext
inquestion.SinceTrumpdenies thecontentof this statement (cf.Kenny2018), it is
possiblethathedidnotmakesuchastatement.However,ifhedid,thenitwasanactof

























notgivenroomtorefute it,eventhoughtheyaretheparties involved. Inaddition, the
perlocutionary intent toexcludethemisexposed.Moreover, thisutterancecamewhen
Trumpsuggestedaone-sidedendtotheTemporaryProtectedStatusprogramforpeople
ofHaitianorigin,andthuscarriedtheforceofsanctionthatHabermasmentionedor“the





　However, racist statements arenot alwaysmanifest or overt.More often, these
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statementsaremadeasa latent-strategicactandseemharmful.Letus takeTrumpʼs
remarksagain.






effect,however, thisstatementappearstobeanassertionthatwhat issaid inthethat
clauseisattributedtorepealtheObama-BideneraAffirmativelyFurtheringFairHousing
(AFFH) rules. Inotherwords, theargument seems tobeabouteconomicandsocial





ofAFFHrules in recentyearshavebeen immigrants. In thiscontext, therefore, this
utteranceshouldhaveatleastthefollowingperlocutionaryeffects: (a)Theassociationof




beattributed toTrumpby theaboveutterance. Inaddition, (c)and (d)wouldnotbe
unrelatedtothefactthatthepresidentialelectionwasclose.Thus,ifheactuallyintended












the frameworkofHabermasʼstheoryofstrategicaction.Rather, Iwillseekaclue from
theanalysisofspeechacttheory,especiallyfromSearleʼstheoryoffiction.Thisisbecause
Searleunderstandsfictionas “pretend” illocutionaryacts.AccordingtoSearle,fictional
utterances including thepresentationof fictionalworks, shouldnotbeconsidered the







to fooltheSecretService into lettingme intotheWhiteHouse, Iampretending in
thefirstsense;ifIpretendtobeNixonaspartofagameofcharades,itispretending
inthesecondsense.(Searle1979,p.65)








whichhorizontal conventionsworkwith specific examples,butdoesnotaddress the
question ofwhat specific conventions are included in thesehorizontal conventions.
3） Asmentioned,Iamproceedingwiththeassumptionthatthe“prioritythesis”ofcommunicative
actioniscorrect.












intentionsof theauthorwhenexaminingaworkof fiction.Perhaps there issome
levelof intentionatwhichthisextraordinaryview isplausible;perhapsone should 
notconsider an authorʼs ulterior motives when analyzing his work,butat themost
basiclevel itisabsurdtosupposeacriticcancompletelyignoretheintentionsofthe
author,since even so much as to identify a text as a novel, a poem, or even as a textis 
already to make a claim about the authorʼs intentions. (Searle1979,p.66,emphasis
mine)
Here,Searledistinguishesbetweentheauthorʼs intentionsaboutwhatsemanticcontent
theworkcontainsandtheauthorʼs intentionsabout itbeingafictional text, reserving
attitudesabout the formerand insistingon the importanceof the latter.The former
intentionisquestionable,perhapsbecauseitisoften“ulterior”andrequiresinterpretation
by readers including critics to becomepublicly acknowledged.The content of the
interpretationorappreciationexperiencecannotbedeterminedbytheauthorʼssecond
intention,namelythat it isafictionandanobjectof interpretationorviewing; inother
words,theintentiontoinvokethehorizontalconventions.
　Thispointcan likelybeunderstoodas follows. InSearleʼsview, the invocationofa
horizontalconvention ismade inutterancesratherthanbyutterances. Inthissense, it
stillbelongstotheillocutionarydimension,andifthespeakerʼsintentiontoinvokeitisnot
conveyed,thespeechwillfailasafiction.Thereaderwillhavehisowninterpretationor





author.Assuch, thisprocess isa resultof theauthorʼsutteranceandbelongs to the
perlocutionarydimension.Searledoesnot referhere to theperlocutionaryeffectsof
fiction,probablybecauseitwasamatterofnosuchimportancetohim,whichcouldonly
beaskedafter thequestionof importance tohimselfwasanswered: “How is fictional
utterancepossible?”Evenifhedoesnotrefertotheperlocutionarydimensionoffiction,
hewouldnotassumethatthisdimensiondoesnotexistinthecaseoffiction.
　Iwould like to incorporate theaboveunderstandingof fictionbySearle tomove
forwardwithmydiscussionofracismutterances.Toclarify, Iamnottryingtoreduce
racistutterances to fiction. Ingeneral, racistutterancesand fictionare twodifferent
things.Theraciststatementasa typeoffictionmayunderestimatetheperlocutionary
harm itcausesandrelieves thespeakerof theresponsibilityshe is supposed tobear.
Evenso, it seems that themostusefulway toconsider theparasiticnatureof racist











(even if it isachainofrocksoracloud),andbasedonthis,we (asviewers)participate inthe
game.WaltoncriticizesSearleʼstheoryoffiction,perhapsbecauseWaltonhasabroaderviewof
fictionthanSearle(cf.Walton1990,pp.75‒89).Ifwelimitoursubjectmattertofictionalworksof
languageartor similarworksof fiction inwhich there is anauthor (oran interpreterwho
identifiessomethingasaworkoffiction),andifweconsidertheperlocutionarydimensionofthe
listenerʼs interpretationof speech, it seemspossible tounderstandboth theoriesconsistently,
althoughIcannotarguethishere.
13Racist Utterances as Quasi-fictional:（Yoshime）
3. Rethinking Habermas’s “Dramaturgical Action”
　PuttingHabermasʼsentiretheoryofcommunicationintoperspective,wecanseemingly
gofurtherinconsideringthepretendingcharacterofquasi-fictionalracistutterances.This
isbecauseacategoryof “dramaturgical action” exists inHabermasʼsclassificationof
humanaction thathehas leftunexplored.Ofcourse,noteverythingdramaturgical is
fictional, andnotall fictionmaybedramaturgical.However, thereseems tobemuch
overlap,andit isnaturaltoassumeaninternalrelationshipbetweenthesecategoriesas
they areboth creative activities distinct fromnon-fictional speech actsmadewith
affirmative speech.However, there is amajor obstacle in this direction.Habermas
classifiesdramaturgicalaction, supposedly includingfictionalspeech,ascommunicative




it (orat least, try to).Asseenabove, this isnotnecessarily inconsistentwithSearleʼs






words,hebelieves that truthful communicativeactioncanalsoproduceavarietyof
perlocutionaryeffects,andthatperlocutionarygoalsandintentionsthataremadepublic
donotaffecttheoutcome(e.g.,justpleasingYʼswifewithoutfurtherintentions)andare
harmless (cf.Cooke1994,p.23).Therefore, itmightbepossible toupdateHabermasʼs
theory of dramaturgical action tomatchhisupdated theory of communicative and
strategicactions, thoughHabermasdoesnotdiscuss it.First, letusexaminehowhe
positioneddramaturgicalaction.
　Habermascategorizeshumanactionsaccordingtotwodistinctions:success-orientedor
understanding-oriented, and the other as social and language-mediated or not.
Communicative action, which is understanding-oriented as well as social and
language-mediated, consists of three “pure types,”namelyconversation,normatively
14
regulatedaction,anddramaturgicalaction.Thesecorrespondto three typesofspeech
acts: constativespeechacts (whichcarry the truthclaim), regulativespeechacts (the
rightnessclaim),andexpressivespeechacts (thetruthfulnessclaim) (cf.Habermas1984,
p.329;Johnson1991,pp.183‒184).Toavoidmisunderstanding, itshouldbeemphasized
that any speechas a communicativeactionmakesall threeof thesevalidity claims
simultaneously, andanyof themcanbe rejectedby thehearer (cf.Habermas1984,
pp. 307;Habermas1994,pp. 59-60).However, it ispossible tomake sucha typology
dependingonwhichof thevalidity claimsof truth, legitimacy, and truthfulness are









theory (cf. Habermas 1985, p. 163) and does not necessarily relate solely to art.
Nonetheless,asthenamesuggests,themosttypicaldramaturgicalactcontinuestobethe





attitudes, desires, feelings etc., to which he alone has privileged access. In
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the twentiethcentury.However, thisviewofart isaconsequenceofhis ideasabout






will not contribute to cultural renewal.This isprecisely the failure experiencedby
surrealists.
Communication processes need a cultural tradition covering all spheres—
cognitivemoral-practicalandexpressive.Arationalizedeverydaylife,therefore,could
hardlybe saved fromcultural impoverishment throughbreaking opena single









　With theabovebackground inmind, letusexaminewhetherquasi-fictional racist
utterancescanbeunderstoodintermsofHabermasʼsdramaturgicalacts.First,basedon
themodificationshemadetostrategicaction,wecanassumethattheexpressivespeech











areutterancesexpressingsomething inoneʼssubjectiveworld to thehearer,and the




specificappreciationexperienceof thespecificprocess thatresults from it, that is, the
contentoftheexpression(e.g.,theworkofart).Thisappreciationexperiencecanbesaid
to be a perlocutionary effect throughwhich interpretations and evaluations are
determined.This is analogous to the fact thatHʼsunderstandingandconsent to the













end-all-be-all of femalehappiness,yetmadeJogetmarried to sell thenovel, thereby
expressingvaluesthatglorifymarriage,thenundertheconditionthatreadersandcritics
have access to information aboutAlcottʼs own ideas, there is reason to reject its
truthfulnessclaim7）.
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bythe invocationofhorizontalconventions (cf.Searle1979,p.67),at least thesincerity
rulemustbemaintained.Rather,theconnectionbetweenlanguageandrealityestablished
by the sincerity rule,whichmustbebroken topretend something, is thepoint of
dramaturgical fiction.However, thismeans thatwhat ismeantby the category of
dramaturgicalactionisincompatiblewithSearleʼstheoryoffiction.
　Habermasʼs idea that dramaturgical action is carried out through the act of an
expressivespeechact(andnotapretensionofit)isalsoconsistentwiththisconclusion.In
thedramaturgicalact,asHabermasputs it, theelementofrole-playingorpretendingis








tobe incomparable toreality, then it ispossible thatherownviewonwomenshe is





　Finally, as away out of this impasse, I would like to propose a hypothetical
interpretation,albeitabriefsuggestion. Iproposeanewkindofcommunicativeaction,
one in which the main focus is on the truth claim and in which the truthfulness claim is 








hearer.Quasi-fictional utterances canbeunderstood as a variant of this category.
However,whilefictionalutterancesarecommunicativeactsinwhichthehearermustbe
madetounderstandtheillocutionaryintentionofnotmakingthetruthfulnessclaim,quasi-




the threevalidity claims.This typeofutterance invades our communicative action
sequencesunder theguise of properdiscourse.However, asHabermasnotes, such







aneconomicandsocialpolicysense, thoughWilkie (2020) isactuallydoing it.This is
becausefactscanbecontestedintermsofhowtheyshouldbefoundandrecognized.By
contesting the facts, the failure tomakea truthfulness claim,whichmeans that the
utteranceisnotlegibleforargumentativediscoursesfromthefirstpoint,ceasestobean
essential issue.Thus,raciststrategicutterancesobtaintheirplace inourdailypraxisof






thedebate,” in response to such a rejectionwhen trying to contest the facts.The
importantthingtodowhenracistutterancesaremadeinthiswayisnottodisputethe
facts,buttocontinuetoexposethehiddenracistperlocutionarygoalsbehindthemandto
establish that the speaker has no intention of responding to the rejection of the
truthfulnessclaim.She isnotthenperformingamutualcommunicativeactionwiththe
hearer,thatis,thatsheintrudedonthedebateinanillegitimatewayfromthebeginning
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tocolonializetherational,argumentative,andcommunicationaldiscourse.
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Racist Utterances as Quasi-fictional:
Rethinking Habermas’s Theory of Strategic and Dramaturgical Actions
 MichihitoYOSHIME
Summary
　　In this paper, I argue that from the standpoint of Habermas’s theory of
communication,racistutterancescanberegardedasakindoffictionalutterance.Thisis
because both are utterances inwhich themain purpose is the realization of the
perlocutionaryeffect,whiletheydonothaveillocutionaryactsasnormalutterances.Itis
clear,however, thatreducingracistspeechto fiction is inappropriateandmisdirected.
Fiction isstillcommunicative in thesenseHabermasmeans,whereasracistutterances
arelatent-strategicaction,andfundamentallydifferentinthatrespect.However,Iargue
thatracistutterancesaresimilartofictionbecausetheyaredisguisedascommunicative
action, and in that sense, canbe regardedasquasi-fictionalutterances.Asaclue to
developingthisargument, thispaperwillexamineSearle’s theoryof fiction.Following
Habermas’s frameworkofcommunication theory,fictionseemsatfirstglance tobean
utterancethatshouldbelongtodramaturgicalaction.However,becausetheelementof
role-playingisrareinexpressivespeechactsasdramaturgicalaction,fictioninthesense
that Searle refers to hasnoproperplace inHabermas’s theory of communication.
Therefore,at theendof thispaper, Iproposeasolution,albeitahypotheticalonethat
positsanewtypeofutterancewithin the frameworkof the theoryofcommunicative
actionandpavesthewayforfurthercriticalconsiderationofracistutterances.
　　Thediscussioninthispaperproceedsasfollows.First,Iwillreviewtheintroduction
of thepositionofstrategicacts inHabermas’s theoryofcommunicativeactionand its
modificationbyHabermashimself,returningtoAustin’stheoryoflinguisticactionaswell.
Next, Iwill attempt to connectwithSearle’s theoryof fiction,which focuseson the
pretentionofillocutionaryacts,byillustratingseveralactualracistutterancesasstrategic
action. Iwill thenrethinkHabermas’s theoryofdramaturgicalaction,argue that this
categoryis incompatiblewiththetypeoffictionalitythat isthesubjectmatterathand,
and suggest ahypothetical solution for treating racistutterancesas latent-strategic
actionswithintheframeworkofHabermas’stheoryofcommunication.
